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Carlos Eduardo Batalha, Sao Paulo / Brazil 
 
Normativity of Law and Interpretive Approaches 
(A Discussion on the Relation between Law and Reason)
1 
 
Abstract: The debates about the interrelations between reason and law have undergone a change after 
the eighteenth century. References to the recta ratio of jusnaturalistic tradition have not disappeared, 
but other comprehensions of legal reason have developed. The European debate over legal positivist 
science has contributed to this in a manifestation of the rationality of law. This transformation may be 
considered  the  basis  for  the  development  of  true  “legal  technologies”  throughout  the  twentieth 
century. On the other hand, in the context of theories of positive law which have taken the relation 
between ethics and legal reason as a problem, the formation of discourses on coercion (Austin and 
Holmes), on validity (Kelsen and Hart) and on justiﬁcation (Alexy and Dworkin) has also contributed 
to  the  emergence  of  new  models  of  legal  rationality.  In  this  paper,  it  is  highlighted  that  the 
construction  of  these  models  is  linked  to  the  “points  of  view”  which  theories  have  proposed  as 
legitimate for the interpretation of legal phenomenon. And it is suggested that the discussion over 
points of view (deﬁned as “focuses”, term which is close to the notion of “attitude”, “stance” or 
“place of speech”) may aid in the debate on the normativity of law.   
Keywords:  legal  rationality;  rightness  of  natural  reason;  point  of  view;  coercion;  validity; 
justification; legal theories; normativity of law. 
 
The theme of this working group is “The Normativity of Law”. As we all know, the term 
“normative” can be discussed in different ways. However, in the history of European legal 
culture, it is possible to identify the existence of a traditional type of discourse on normativity, 
within  the  tradition  of  jusnaturalistic  thought.  Within  this  tradition,  the  discussion  over 
normativity converged to the debate over relations between law and reason. The normativity 
of law was based on the affirmation of rightness of natural reason and its discussion was 
carried out through the association between lex naturalis and recta ratio. In the legal tradition, 
to understand the legal normativity was equal to understand the legal rationality.  
In the transition from medieval to modern culture, the relation between law and reason 
have  undergone  some  modifications.  One  major  change  was  the  emergence  of  a  new 
comprehension of reason, closer and closer to the notion of consciousness. This appears in the 
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writings of some followers of St. Thomas Aquinas, who began to turn consciousness into a 
property of mind, not only related to the acts, but also to mind itself (as self-awareness). It 
also  appears  in  the  work  of  Abelard,  who  emphasized  that  to  sin  was  to  act  against 
conscience, and not against dictates which are of an external nature to men. In the context of 
the Protestant Reformation, these ideas eventually influence the development of individual 
consciousness as a “moral sense”.  
Within this new understanding, the discussion of the normativity of law has   gained a 
different direction. It was redirected into the anthropological realm of the   subject of law. The 
normativity was then linked to the nature of man (to be understood as a naturally bearer of 
rights). Beside the traditional discourse of natural law, the discourse of natural rights emerges. 
This  appears  in  the  work  of  Grotius  even  before  the  formulation  of  the  metaphysics  of 
Descartes.  This  innovation,  however,  does  not  change  the  tradition  of  discussing  the 
normativity of law by means of the discussion of the   relationship between law and reason.  
The  traditional  discussion  over  normativity  only  changed  when  modernity  begins  to 
break with the very idea of right reason inherited from the classical culture. The first sign of 
this rupture is usually identified at the thought of Hobbes.  In his work the idea that law 
corresponds  to  what  is  not  contrary  to  the  right  reason  is  still  present.  The  English 
philosopher, however, criticizes the understanding of the right reason as the infallible basis 
for normalizing. To Hobbes, in the context of human nature, the claims for reason as an 
ultimate judge for all controversies are simply claims for things to be determined by the 
consciousness of each individual. Natural reason is nothing but a private assessment, through 
which every man realizes the appropriate means for their own preservation. The rationality of 
law, therefore, should be associated with the utility of law. Hobbes recognizes that this is a 
problem and, to face it, he proposes that the natural reason need to be overcome by the social 
authority of the holders of sovereign power. In order to form a civil society, it is necessary to 
build  unity  through  authority.  Thus,  the  question  of  the  normativity  of  law  changes 
profoundly. It begins to be discussed as the issue of “positivity”
2.  
This  emphasis  on  the  new  issue  of  “positivity”  is  accompanied  by  two  other 
transformations of rationality, which also end up passing under the law. On the one hand, in 
the  final  period  of  the  Italian  Renaissance,  Giovanni  Botero  and  Federico  Bonaventura 
theoretically develop a new conception of political prudence that was known by the name of 
“reason of state”. The idea of “reason of state” allows governments to put themselves above 
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the law to serve the purpose of conserving the state. So it begins to gain strength that the 
rationality of law belongs to the field of politics. On the other hand, the establishment of 
natural laws, the new physics of Galileo Galilei and Francis Bacon's New Organon no longer 
promote the classic separation between episteme and techne, that is, between science and 
mechanical  arts.  Both  converge  to  a  change  of  attitude  towards  techniques,  with  the 
proposition of a new scientific rationality, mathematical and operative, which owns the truth 
and falsehood with a view to practical consequences. This modern know-how is not just a 
utilitarian reason, it is also an alliance between science and technique, which begin to merge 
toward the formation of what came to be called techno-science or technology.  
For the rationality of law, these modern set of changes clarify the separation between 
legal knowledge and ethical wisdom. It indicates the emergence of a new attitude towards 
law. This new position advocates two new ideas: on the one hand, the thesis of historical and 
social sources of legal phenomenon, on the other hand, the thesis of the conceptual separation 
between law and morality. This new approach has   received the label “legal positivism”.  
The appearance of positivity as a new way to understand normativity also modifies the 
very context in which the legal debate is carried out. This context is now set to be a clash 
between  supporters  of  the  approach  called  “legal  positivism”  and  the  supporters  of  the 
contrary position, which can be summarized under the name of "non-positivism", although 
this  stance  could  receive  different  denominations  (“natural  law”,  “legal  realism”, 
“humanism”, “hermeneutics” etc.). More recently, especially after the postscript written by 
Hart,  the  context  has  also  been  characterized  by  another  dispute:      the  debate  between 
“inclusive positivism” and “exclusive positivism” (or between hard and soft positivism). In 
the  Brazilian  legal  theory,  the  contemporary  debate  has  also  been  characterized  by  the 
confrontation  between  “positivism” and “post-positivism” (which, for the most part of it, 
gravitates  towards  a  “neoconstitutionalism”,  whose  main  reference  is  the  work  of  Robert 
Alexy on fundamental rights).  
This  association,  however,  should  not  bring  the  idea  that  the  debate  over  relations 
between  law  and  reason  has  disappeared  after  the  characterization  of  normativity  from 
positivity. Nor is it appropriate to develop the idea that the debate between law and reason 
continues  only  by  means  of  the  persistence  of  jusnaturalistic  tradition.  There  are  many 
examples showing the debates on positive law do not fully untied jusnaturalistic rationality 
after the eighteenth century. Both the projects of codification developed in the nineteenth 
century and the reconstruction of human rights discourse in the twentieth century are inspired 
by the recta ratio which comes from natural law discourse (classical or modern). However, 4 
alongside the persistent discourse of natural law, it is also possible to recognize the formation 
of  new  understandings  of  legal  rationality  in  the  context  of  theories  of  positive  law  that 
assume the relation between ethics and legal reason as a problem. These new understandings 
are expressed in a peculiar way, by means of the images, the metaphors and the points of 
views  which  these  theories  have  been  proposing  as  legitimate  to  interpret  the  legal 
phenomenon.  The  organization  of  the  main  points  of  view  (understood  as  “interpretive 
approaches”,  close  to  the  notions  of  “attitude”,  “stance”  or  “place  of  speech”)  allows  to 
discuss, in general, in the form of three major models, the place left vacant by right reason on 
the field of law.  
In chronological terms, the first new model of legal rationality to occupy this place began 
to be built in the nineteenth century with the development of theories of   positive law that 
rejected jusnaturalistic metaphysics on behalf of an “ethics of utility”   or an “enlightened 
skepticism”.  Among  these  theories,  we  can  highlight  the  imperativist          theory  of  law 
(especially the command theory of law established by the English jurist John Austin in the 
early nineteenth century) as well as various forms of legal realism (in particular, the theory 
about the predictions of what the courts will do in fact, introduced by the American judge 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in 1897). These views maintain the image of the positive law as a 
set of coercive commands of a sovereign,   already present in modern jusnaturalism, from 
Hobbes to Kant. However, in an unprecedented way, these studies deepen the relation among 
law and politics,   economics, psychology etc. The field of debate on the foundations of 
positivity  was      definitely  shifted  from  nature  to  society,  with  the  formulation  of  new 
approaches (the "social point of view" suggested by Austin and the "point of view of a bad 
man"  proposed  by  Holmes)  which  emphasized  the  importance  of  coercion  in  the 
manifestation  of  law,  bringing  the  legal  phenomenon  and  the  traditional  image  of  power 
closer as domination and empire. Since then, these theories eventually presented legal reason 
in the form of common rationality between law and politics, reaffirming and consolidating 
one of many lines of thought already present in the Hobbesian theory.  
A second peculiar model of legal rationality can be identified in the constitution of other 
legal theories about the internal elements of positive law itself, understood as a system. It 
appears (during the first half of the twentieth century) both in the proposed purification of 
legal theories developed by the distinction between “being” and “ought to be” drawn by the 
Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (with his theory of the “basic norm”) and the internal view of the 
ordinary legal language highlighted by research on social rules  conducted by the English 
jurist Herbert L. A. Hart (with his theory of the “rule of recognition”). These theories replace 5 
the focus on facticity of the legal phenomenon, built on the theories of Austin and Holmes, by 
the focus on normativity (strict sense), which is found by Kelsen in the “point of view of a 
disinterested third” (that appears in an ambiguous way, from the perspective of the norm as 
“scheme of  interpretation” and the view of legal science that describes “norm” as “legal 
propositions”), while Hart builds his theory by means of the complementation of the external 
observer’s point of view (from which not even Kelsen escapes) by considering the “internal 
point of view of the legal system”, that is, from the point of view of those who use the rules as 
reasons  and  justification  for  criticism  of  the  behavior  of  themselves  and  others,  not  just 
limited to describe and predict what the law is.  
Under  this  new  approach,  the  consideration  of  the  positivity  by  means  of  laws  and 
judgments was replaced by the analysis of “norms” or “social rules”. These new designation 
of positive law are brought together in the form of a “legal system”. In the context of this 
process of abstraction, imperativistic and realistic elaborations – by means of which coercion 
appeared as the core element of the definition of law – have to live with new images of the 
legal phenomenon, quite distinct from each other. The image (geometrically) constructed by 
Kelsen emphasizes  the  form  of a hierarchy of  valid norms. Hart, on the other hand, has 
(functionally) presented the legal phenomenon as a complex social practice similar to a game. 
In any way, despite the differences between these images, the legal theories of both authors 
point out to the notion of validity. Positive law is to be characterized as a system of legal valid 
norms. The place of the legal reason is then occupied by a conception of a proper rationality 
of law.  
In  addition  to  the  approaches  of  facticity  and  normativity,  with  their  respective 
investigations  of  coercion  and  validity,  a  third  peculiar  model  of  legal  rationality  is 
noticeable, whose construction has  drawn the attention of many jurists,  at  least  since the 
second half of the twentieth century . His field of development lies in the theories which are 
critical to the idea that positive law could be understood merely by means of the category of 
validity. In this context, it is argued that the notion of validity is not capable of dealing with 
the identification of rights, especially with regard to the complex situation of recognition of 
fundamental rights within the cases. To deal with these situations, in the context of legal 
theories,  it  is  necessary  to  redirect  the  study  of  social  practices,  of  which  law  is  part, 
discussing the search for parameters in the process of applying the positive law.  
In a certain way, the Hartian conception of a social rule as practical reason went in that 
direction. However, the rule of recognition theory proposed focus for understanding the social 
practices  has  not  developed  the  issue  of  legal  argumentation,  nor  offers  elements  for  a 6 
renewed discussion of aspects of political morality which are involved in law enforcement. 
On the one hand, Hart presented a quite traditional view of these themes, in terms of a theory 
of the “virtues” attributed to the laws and judicial decisions considered fair. On the other 
hand,  Hart’s  theoretical  project  oscillated  between  a  “descriptive  sociology”  and 
“hermeneutics”.  In  a  supposedly  external,  neutral  and  uncompromised  level,  Hart  has 
submitted  for  conceptual  analysis  substantive  and  engaged  issues,  related  to  freedom, 
equality, rule of law and other political ideals. In this regard, what has been lately proposed as 
a  model  of  legal  rationality  aims  mainly  at  overcoming  these  limits  by  means  of  the 
construction of new approaches for understanding the recognition of fundamental rights as a 
part of the justification of legal arguments.  
Among   these   new   approaches,   the   balancing   theory   proposed   by   the   German 
jurist Robert Alexy has great diffusion (particularly in Brazil). This approach   differs from 
Hart’s “internal point of view”, in it understands legal argumentation from   the point of view 
of a specific participant who demands for “correctness” in a legal decision. In these terms, a 
new image of the legal phenomenon became possible, not only as a normative system, but 
rather  as  a  system  of  procedures  (including  the  balancing  oriented  by  the  maxim  of 
proportionality). However, Alexy's theory still intertwines the ideal and critical dimensions of   
correctness with the dimensions of validity. His thesis that the most essential characteristic of 
law is its dual nature, composed by coercion and correctness, offers abounding material to 
confirm this mixture, which brings so many ambiguities to his theory. 
Therefore, the delineation of a new model of legal rationality seems more explicit and 
clear with “the judge’s point of view” constructed by the integrity theory of Law by U.S. 
jurist Ronald Dworkin. Under this approach, it is possible to understand how judges who have 
the obligation of deciding hard cases do not see themselves as retroactive legislators, but as 
authors of the discovery of moral rights which the parties in the process have in each case. 
This discovery occurs through the practice of constructive interpretation, which emphasizes 
the image of the positive law as a chain connection novel and presents the legal phenomenon 
not only by means of politics, but also, and most importantly, as a phenomenon linked to 
political morality. Thus, the legal arguments developed in the grounds of judicial decisions 
allow us to understand the importance of proper justification for theoretical characterization 
of  the  rationality  of  law.  Positive  law  is  manifested  as  an  attitude,  interpretive  and  self-
reflexive, directed to  the politics  in  a broad sense, to  make every  citizen responsible for 
imagining what are the public commitments of their society to principles. Accordingly, for its 
emphasis on the aspect of justification, the model of legal reason that results from the points 7 
of view constructed by Alexy and Dworkin can be denominated as shared rationality between 
law and political morality.  
Based on these three  great  models  of legal  rationality developed since the  crisis  the 
notion of right reason in modernity, it is possible to see that the opposition centered   on the 
notion of “positivism” is not adequate to characterize the development of theories of law that 
arise from nineteenth century. This development is linked to a debate marked by diversity. To 
understand  this  diversity,  the  debate  needs  to  be  related  to  different  views  and  different 
images brought by lawyers for the formulation of new  models of legal rationality, which now 
point  to  the  external  relations  between  law  and  force,  sometimes  only  for  the  internal   
relations of the legal system, sometimes for the  relationships and ethical implications of law 
and democracy. Thus, the debate on normativity seems best characterized by its division into 
three great debates: the debate on the basis of coercion (started in the nineteenth century), the 
discussion of the validity function (developed in the twentieth century) and the debate on the 
basis of justification (which marks the last 30 years). 
  In this sense, to rethink normativity in the contemporary law, I believe it´s appropriate 
to have in mind ideas already suggested by Joseph Raz: “Perhaps it is not time to refute legal 
positivism,  but  to  forget  the  label  and  consider  the  views  of  various  writers  within  that 
tradition on their own terms”
3. Unlike Raz, however, I lay emphasis on the consideration of 
different  points  of  view  instead  of  the  investigation  of  pure  social  facts.  I  believe  it´s 
important to study the confrontation between the different “interpretive approaches” built by 
the  legal  theories.  The  study  of  images  and  points  of  view  allows  us  to  resume  the 
investigation of rationality into the discussion of normativity. That's what I put for discussion 
in this workgroup.  
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